Bill Harponski

The following posted by Bill Harponski:

Gentlemen: I'm writing a book on armored cavalry in Vietnam and will greatly appreciate your input. I hope to show how all elements, from crew up, worked together during pacification and combat missions. I was S-3, then XO of 11th Cav in '68, then CO of 1-4 Cav in '69. D Company 1-11 ACR was opcon to my task force for the largest single battle of Atlas Wedge on 30 March 1969. You troopers are a very important part of my story and I need as much information from you as you can supply. Although I am writing this story I hope that more importantly it is a story of all cav troopers, and that in some way it can honor all those who were grievously injured, emotionally distressed, or killed while serving their country.

I'm attaching a portion of my detailed notes which I am using to seek input. There are 8 questions spaced throughout the text, and I ask you to answer as fully as you can. If the memories are too disturbing and you do not care to reply, I understand. Frankly, for almost 30 years after leaving Vietnam I could not talk about it, but finally got some good counseling. Now I have to try to tell my story, my troopers' story, and I hope you will help me. I think it needs to be told, especially in these challenging times. If any of you are in contact with other D Troopers who were there that day, please let me know their e-mail addresses. Thanks, Bill

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D COMPANY 1-11 ACR TIME LINE, ATLAS WEDGE

Note: Following are detailed notes which I will use to assist me in writing the portion of my book related to Atlas Wedge. This material is based on many original records of 1st Inf Div units in Vietnam and is believe to be as accurate as possible at this point in my research. However, it is not a final product, and I ask that it not be copied or forwarded to anyone other than a D Company trooper, or used on a web site. In May at National Archives I will copy all 11 ACR documents relating to Atlas Wedge 17 Mar - 3 Apr 69 and will post them on 1-4 Cav archives site for your use. I already have copied some records relating to the regiment's actions, indicating 1st Squadron's participation in the early days of the operation. The records yet to be obtained should give more details of D/1-11 actions. An after-action map of Atlas Wedge is posted at www.quartercav.net. Before I get into 30 Mar, I have these questions:

From 1st Inf Div Daily Journal, 22 Mar, 1538: 11th ACR main gun discharge kills 1, wounds 1 at Thunder 1.

1. Was this a D Company accident, and if so, was there any administrative or punitive action? (If D Company, must be a platoon not with the company hq which was near the Michelin at the time. See next entry.) Details?

From Division Sitrep, D/1-11 rec'd RPG at XT594577. This is 1 kilometer into the jungle off the eastern edge of the Michelin, near the location of 3-11 squadron's fight of 20 March.

2. Did D Company also go into the rubber itself during Atlas Wedge (other than on the 30th), and if so, can you recall any actions during the period 17 - 24 March?

Following are extracts from notes I have prepared in an attempt to reconstruct this battle from the original records which include 1-4 Cav, 3d Brigade, 11th ACR, 1st Inf Div, Div Arty, infantry battalions, and other sources. At various points I pause to ask questions of you. Please answer as many as you can as fully as you can.

ATTACK INTO MICHELIN, 30 MAR 69

Prior events: From 22-25 March, Task Force Haponski has been conducting reconnaissance in force (RIF) missions 40 miles north of Saigon in the northeastern portion of the Michelin Plantation. On the XT (X-Ray Tango) map sheet that commanders down to platoon level carry, the plantation shows as an irregular oblong shape of rubber trees extending 8 miles north to south and 6 miles east to west surrounded by jungle. Running through the rubber generally in a north-south and east-west direction are many parallel service roads, intersecting at 90 degrees making an orderly patchwork pattern. The dirt roads, actually often just tracks, vary in distance apart from about 500 to 1,000 yards. Movement is not restricted to the roads. The task force's armored vehicles can easily travel the plantation floor in a north-south direction between the rows of trees which are about 16 -18 feet apart. Due to sometimes irregular spacing, travel in an east-west direction is somewhat more difficult, but still relatively easy. Diagonal travel would require knocking down trees, and is extremely difficult. Several streams cut deep ravines through the rubber, and the streams are fordable in some places, in others not. Small bridges cross the streams and are capable of carrying plantation vehicular traffic but not armored vehicles. In better days the roads were regularly traveled by small trucks hauling equipment and rubber latex containers. Now, many of the bridges are destroyed, and the old ruins of a French fort remind an intruder that earlier battles have been fought here. Lai Khe, the 1st Division headquarters, lies 12 miles to the east. Dau Tieng, a small city and military base in the 25th Infantry Division zone, is just off the southeastern tip of the rubber. These days, because of the war, the Michelin is only partially a working rubber plantation, largely unkempt. It has seen many prior battles but has not been fought in recently..

On 16 March 1969, II Field Forces headquartered at Long Binh had ordered a multi-division exercise, Operation Atlas Wedge, to engage the NVA 7th Division and supporting units, some 8,000 or more well-trained, well-equipped troops. Intelligence showed they had moved into the rubber and the jungle surrounding the Michelin with intention of organizing an attack on Saigon. Large caches of weapons and supplies were being stocked for the offensive. Beginning on 17 March, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment moved into the rubber and fought some sharp engagements, driving the bulk of the enemy into the surrounding jungle. 1-4 Cav with one cav troop and one infantry company had been working the jungle to the east of the rubber until 22 March when we came under operational control of the regiment and moved into the plantation. On the 24th, 11 ACR was withdrawn from Atlas Wedge to resume its former mission to the east and south, leaving FSB Doc at the eastern edge of the rubber under my command, and the Michelin all to us. TF Haponski was returned to opcon 3d Brigade. We continued to work the rubber until the evening of the 25th, having several small contacts, and discovering huge base camp complexes. We began destroying weapons and supply caches and blowing bunkers. Before we had progressed very far, division ordered us to pull back into FSB Doc to allow the plantation to fill up again with NVA. (It did.)

On 26 and 27 March we occupy Fire Support Patrol Base Doc at the eastern edge of the plantation and RIF the jungle to the east with only minor contacts.

28 Mar. I anticipate an attack on the night of 27/28 Mar and order 100% alert after midnight. At 0215 the enemy hits us with mortars, rockets, rifle-propelled grenades, machine guns and small arms in a two-company-size ground assault on FSB Doc, followed by another attack before daylight, and thereafter sporadic mortars, RPGs and small arms fire until noon. During the night we counter the attacks with armored sweeps and supporting fires, and after daylight with an air assault and armored sweeps. Believing that the attack was meant to screen large-scale movements in the plantation to the immediate west, I begin planning an attack from FSB Doc into the rubber. Having only 1 cav troop (my infantry company is needed for FSB defense), I tell Brigade that I want additional forces. One of the camps we had found a few days ago had recently-constructed bunkers sufficient for 1500 men, and there were several other smaller camps outlying it. Bravo Troop is detached from the infantry battalion south of me and returned to my control at Doc. I ask for my A Troop to come up from Di An but division wants them to continue their security mission in that area. At 2257 hours Colonel Bob Haldane, the brigade CO, calls to tell me I will instead be getting a tank company minus one platoon opcon from 11th ACR. They will march overland from Lai Khe, to arrive not later than 1500 the next day. This will give me three major ground maneuver units, two or three infantry platoons, and most of D Troop (Air) which will be under my command.

29 Mar 0702. I ask Haldane to fly out from his headquarters at Lai Khe to Doc to finalize plans for the attack. I want to give the enemy the impression I am planning operations in the jungle to the east of the Michelin, so I send B and C Troops RIFing for short distances in that direction and use my infantry company, A/2-28, in its usual role of local RIFs around Doc. Haldane likes my plan and we arrange for brigade and higher level support, to include an infantry company from 1-28 Infantry out of FSB Picardy to our south, and a CIDG company (Vietnamese civil defense group) out of Minh Than to the north of Lai Khe on Highway 13, both to be air assaulted on my command into mobile blocking positions. At 1405 hours, Brigade informs me that D/1-11 ACR, the tank company minus one tank platoon, has married up with engineers at Thunder I, the permanent FSB 5 miles north of Lai Khe. One of their tanks had mechanical problems and was left at Thunder I. Since I want more than the one squad of engineers we already have with us for this operation, they will ride out on the tanks [or perhaps the engineers referred to in the logs are an extra AVLB -- check engineer battalion logs]. At 1433 Brigade places the tank company under my operational control even though it is still many miles distant. It will have to road march six miles north from Lai Khe, then head west for 12 miles along what is called Boundary Road, a giant swath cut out of the jungle leading west to the Michelin. It is obvious the company will not arrive at Doc by 1500 as I was earlier told, and now I am hoping it can close before dark so I can brief the company commander on my plan. Although I had been S-3 and XO of 11th Cav, I do not know the company commander, Captain Wyse, who took over in January after I had left the regiment.

D Company 11th ACR with its two tank platoons of probably 10 or 11 tanks and VTR proceeds toward Doc. Often an advancing column can make it all the way down Boundary Road west to the Michelin without hitting one or more mines, but sometimes not. Delayed in their start, D Company is still west of Doc when night falls. Captain Wyse requests permission to remain over night (RON) two miles short of Doc rather than risk traveling the rest of the way. This makes sense, to draw into their usual circular RON position for nighttime defense rather than chance being ambushed in the dark or hitting the mines that are increasingly numerous the closer one gets to Doc. (Two of our squadron tracks had already hit mines a few days earlier just outside the perimeter, wounding some troopers.) I regret the necessity of D Company's RON since I now have no way of meeting face to face with a company commander I did not know. At 1900, D/1-11 and 1 platoon of B/1-18 RON at XT 641526. I believe I had the platoon ferried out from Doc on ACAVs just before dark to be dropped off and married up with the oncoming tank company, realizing that the tank column would not be able to make it all the way to Doc. I did not want the tanks without infantry during the night. At 2055 I instruct my TOC to ensure that D Company (Call sign "Baton") gives a sitrep every 15 minutes, and if not to immediately notify my C Troop.

3. Question: Can anyone recall this RON? Also, at this point I presume the infantry platoon stayed with you and rode on the tanks into the attack? Recollections?

By 1900 it is dark and troops at Doc are making final preparations. Inside the perimeter are the artillery and my headquarters ACAV section of 4 tracks, the medical platoon with its 2 tracks, and the infantry company, A/2-28, except for its normal nightly ambush patrol and half of a platoon which is with C Troop in RON some 500 meters south. [Logs also imply other infantry, probably the rest of B/1-18.] C Troop is positioned a short distance to the south. Before dawn they will lay down an AVLB which will leave Doc under ACAV escort just as the troop stands to in the morning..

For air support I will have command of most of D Troop (Air) out of Phu Loi, and a FAC on station for air strikes on call. Artillery support will come primarily from D/1-5, the artillery battery of six 105 howitzers, and a platoon of B/8-6, the two 155 howitzers I have in Doc. They have stocked up on ammunition which has been airlifted into the fire support base, and it lies ready in bunkers near the gun emplacements. If I need more artillery, I can get it from 155 guns in the fire support base to my south or from 25th Division's huge 8 inchers positioned at Dau Tieng although some of my operational area will be beyond their reach. [Check units and ranges.]

The attack will be with 2 cavalry troops, the air cavalry troop, a tank company minus, and two [or three? Check further.] infantry platoons riding on the armored vehicles. Our plan is to move out from individual unit sites and join in column just before daylight, launch one AVLB, move across, then turn north then west and quickly launch another AVLB across a second stream at the edge of the southernmost base camp. Rules of engagement preclude an air or artillery prep on the camp. We intend to go in fast and be in among the enemy before they can organize. C Troop with its attached infantry platoon is to lead the attack. The squadron headquarters medical platoon tracks will move with C Troop's headquarters. Following will be my headquarters ACAV section, then the tank company. B Troop, at the tail of the column, is to cross the first stream, then move north. It will not cross the second AVLB but instead stay east of the stream and RIF through the rubber to a mobile blocking position to the north, past where the stream becomes fordable. An infantry company, C/1-28, is to load at FSB Picardy to our south and air assault into a mobile blocking position just outside the rubber to the northeast. The aero rifle platoon of the Air Cav troop is to be on call for insertion wherever I need them. The CIDG Company is planned for air assault later in the day. Once into the base camp, C Troop is to strike west in double column, then turn on line for a northern sweep. The tank company behind them is to come in behind them and pivot on line to the right of C Troop and attack north. Squadron headquarters section is to follow in the center, to be used as needed..

[From the journal of our squadron surgeon, Dr. Steve McGeady:

"30 March. Palm Sunday. . . . The big strategy was that we would surprise the enemy by using an AVLB. The NVA were very smart the way they set up his base camp. Always it was near a creek or ditch that armor couldn't cross & often the camp occupied either side of the natural barrier. In one such area we had to go north about 2 clicks, cross & come back to get to the base camp. The Col wanted to put the AVLB across at the base camp & Charlie would find us in his lap before he knew what had happened."]

It's a simple plan, nothing fancy. In fact, we had RIF'd north through this same base camp, occupied only by a few caretaker squads, before we had been pulled out of the Michelin. But we have an alternate plan. The second AVLB site is a concern since we could not do a ground reconnaissance in advance because of the need for secrecy. From the air it looked okay. If the site proves to be not usable, we will go north to a fording site we had used during our preceding forays into the rubber and attack south. I want to use the primary plan and attack north since, from our earlier RIFs, we had found most of the bunker firing ports facing north. If the bunkers are now occupied in force we would like to take the bulk of them from the rear. The configuration of the known enemy base camp leads me to conclude that the enemy believes the streams will preclude us from attacking from the south. The AVLBs, however, make this feasible. Our total troop strength in the maneuver elements and airlifted companies is perhaps 700 or so men. We do not know the enemy strength, but based on our recent experience in the rubber, and remembering the unblown bunkers in the extensive base camps capable of holding multiple battalions, we are prepared for a fight.

After D Company RONs I brief Captain Wyse by secure-voice radio. This is a device designed to scramble and decode signals. It is most unsatisfactory at squadron and troop/company level - finicky to adjust, and difficult to transmit over. Usually I almost have to shout slowly and clearly in order to be heard, and in turn have to listen carefully to the other person. We use secure voice only when extreme secrecy is required, as in this situation. At other times we transmit in the clear.

In his after-action interview, Selsor describes the plan: "[In addition to my troop] the Squadron had Bravo Troop and also had Delta Troop from the 1-11 ACR which was the tank company. Bravo was supposed to sweep north on the east side of the stream. We were crossing over to the west side. The tank company was supposed to follow me across, and they were to be part of my right flank and sweep north with me. So they were right behind me in the column of march."

30 Mar 0001. In and near Doc, at midnight the bulk of our troops are trying to get some rest, rotating the normal watch duty during darkness which keeps about one-third awake at any given time.

0100. As prelude to our attack and part of plans involving other units of the Atlas Wedge operation, division artillery opens up from three fire support bases with six batteries on targets of suspected enemy base camps in the jungle to the east of the rubber. All impacts are kept out of the Michelin. The guns in Doc erupt, firing a total of 32 rounds rapidly on 8 targets to the north and east of the rubber, jolting awake those of us trying to catch some rest.

At 0342 everyone is again instantly awakened when C Troop receives 2 RPG rounds and small arms fire in its RON position 500 yards south of Doc. Their tanks open up with canister from the main guns and .50 calibers mounted on top of the turrets. The ACAVs fire their .50 cal and 7.62mm machine guns. In the next few minutes a platoon of the troop moves to contact and takes more small arms fire. Almost as suddenly as it began it's over, a small probe. At 0410 I order a return to normal alert status for troops both outside and inside Doc.

0449. D Company reports stand-to complete. Thirty minutes later, in the faint light that is more dark than light, D Company moves out to join the rest of the task force in and near Doc.

H Hour, the 13th day of Atlas Wedge, is 0545, and all vehicles are moving out. At 0606, C Troop, leading, reports SP toward the first stream crossing site, code for having crossed a designated start point. The clouded sky is growing lighter, and at 0626 Captain Selsor, troop commander, reports he has the first AVLB in place and is crossing. Eighteen minutes later his column is on the other side of the stream. He has three cavalry platoons with 3 tanks and 6 or 7 ACAVs each, and his platoon of infantry clings to the outsides of the tracks. A tank leads, followed by the second AVLB, positioned well ahead in the column for immediate launch, and then the armored personnel carrier of his engineer squad. His headquarters ACAV, his M88 tracked recovery vehicle (VTR), and the squadron medical platoon tracks are tucked in behind the lead platoon so they can be close to the launching site and assist as needed. My four squadron headquarters ACAVs and a squadron VTR follow C Troop's rear vehicle across, closely tailed by the D Company tanks and their VTR.

From Selsor's after-action interview: "The concept of the operation for that morning when we left was for my troop to lead, and I had two AVLBs with me. There was one creek running before you actually get into the rubber where we had to launch the bridge to get across. We were then to go into the Michelin, and there are natural barriers there. There is a stream that runs north and south which splits our AO of the Michelin in half. Before, when we operated in there, we had to go farther north to [ford] the creek. We had [had] to go quite far north into our AO in order to get across the creek and then sweep south in this area where we had found base camps. The concept that morning was to launch a bridge, an AVLB, across the creek at a southern point, go across it, and then get on line and sweep north up through the base camp area. We left at 0545 in the morning. We had the first bridge in place by 0630. We had gone across that with no incidents. We had cut up through the rubber and cut up to the place where we planned to put the AVLB in. We were still in column. I was in column with three platoons in column and my troop headquarters behind the 1st platoon. The third platoon was leading, and the third platoon leader had the [second] AVLB with him."

I watch in the growing light as well as I can from Doc, impatiently waiting for my LOH to arrive. The loach had been confirmed for arrival at 0630, and I fret as that time passes and none is in sight. Even a few minutes are precious. Finally, at 0654 Pony 102 reports he is on station, appears on the horizon and lands in a cloud of dust and flying grass and leaves. I clamber into the left front seat while my artillery liaison officer gets into the rear with two PRC 25 radios, one for him and one for me if I need to dismount. Ever since I had assumed command in January I had been unsuccessful in getting division to recognize the need for a proper Huey command and control ship for our operations. I had had to content myself with getting a LOH on call when we were in contact, or sometimes when I needed it for reconnaissance. These small helicopters, built like an egg with a rotor on top and a boom with a small rotor sticking out the tail, were tough little birds but grossly inadequate for command and control. I had watched division staff officers come and go in their Huey C&Cs, and I made the point more than once with my higher commanders and division staff, to no avail. This morning, for a planned attack, the major division operation of the day, they sent me a #%@!! LOH with its usual radio, one FM frequency. I could not monitor troop activity at all, and when I needed to speak with the brigade commander, I had to switch from the squadron frequency. Intercom most often didn't work in an aviation battalion LOH, so I was faced with my usual procedure of shouting instructions over engine and rotor blade noise to my artillery liaison officer in the back seat. The C&C ship I had used in the 11th Cav, with its beautiful bank of radios, flashes into my mind, and, not a cussing man, I cuss.

At 0650 Wyse reports he has crossed the first AVLB bridge, and Captain Dennis, the B Troop commander, has his radio operator report he is right behind Wyse and then across at 0705. Now, still climbing after takeoff, I can see that the ground element has completed its first major task.

3. Question: Do any of you D Troopers recall any details of the above, up to this point?

0708. My call sign is Whiskey 55. I report to the TOC that I'm airborne. I'm barely up at the usual altitude of 1500 feet, taken to avoid small arms fire, when I see my air cav in the distance and get a call from Darkhorse 6, Major Willie Cummings, the D Troop (Air) commander. He says he is setting both of his hunter-killer teams down at Doc, and putting the ARPs down at Picardy, the Fire Support Base 3 miles south of Doc, to be ready on call as planned. I tell Cummings negative, put the ARPs down, but I don't want the HKTs to land. Selsor has made better progress than we had anticipated, and I can see the head of his column approaching the second AVLB site at the edge of the enemy base camp. I tell Cummings it is time for his HKTs to go in. Our scouts drop down and level off several hundred yards short of their intended search area, and now, skimming the treetops, they look down through the foliage covering the enemy base camp.

"Holy shit," one of the scouts shouts into his mike to the Cobra gun ship above him, not bothering with call signs. Enemy are scattering in all directions a few feet under his skids. "Mark!" meaning that the enemy is directly beneath him. "Enemy in open in bunker complex,." he reports. The front seat gunner in the overhead gun ship has been following the scout ship locations on his map, constantly keeping in mind their position. "This is Darkhorse 34," the pilot in the rear seat calmly responds, "Troops in base camp at X-Ray Tango 570532," repeating the coordinates the gunner has given him. "I'm rolling in. Three-five will be right behind me." I hear none of this since it is on the air cav's frequency and I have only the squadron frequency to monitor, but Cummings quickly reports what I can see happening, the scouts now off to the side and the two gun ships with nose down making their run and firing rockets in salvoes, one after the other. I see the smoke trails and nearly instantaneous impacts, hear the whumping sounds and see black-gray smoke rising above the canopy.

Just at this time, less than a mile to the west of where the rockets are striking in the foliage and on the floor of the plantation, the lead vehicles of C Troop emerge into a clearing a hundred meters or so short of the intended bridge site. I hear Selsor's voice at high pitch, "Whiskey 55 this is Charlie 55. We have contact." They can see a platoon-size enemy unit on the opposite bank and 3 NVA are frantically stringing wire through the trees to connect their telephones. Selsor's lead tank and ACAVs behind it fan out and open up with main gun high explosive and machine guns, firing across the stream into the trees beyond.

[From here, I include excerpts to outline major events, omitting some details the records provide.]

. . . I order Bravo Troop to the east to hold up until the situation develops. I do not want them to get too far north. . . . At 0725 I hear my LNO behind me call, "On the way, wait," and I see the puffs of smoke two miles or so south at Doc as D/1-5 and B/8-6 fire. In a few moments the rounds impact off to our left front in the rubber, the 105 and 155 millimeter shells making loud crumps as they land, much louder than the earlier rockets.

The time is 0727, H plus 1 hour 42 minutes, and the day-long battle has begun.

The Division after action report states: "Contact in the area of operation [after the enemy attack on FSB Doc on the 28th] was negligible again until 30 Mar when TF Haponski engaged in one of the most significant contacts of Atlas Wedge."

This is an understatement. Our battle turned out to be not only the single largest battle of Atlas Wedge with more of both friendly and enemy KIA than any other (over 100 dead), but was the biggest fight in all of Vietnam on this day and for many more days to come. And like most battles at this stage in the war, it went unnoticed by all except those who fought it.

[From Selsor's after-action interview:] "We reached the second AVLB site, and [my lead] platoon had pulled up, and they had their squad of engineers with them who had dismounted and started to sweep the road [to the crossing site] with security forces of their own. There were about six men on the ground with a tank right behind them on the road. The AVLB was directly behind them, and the tank was behind that as security. As we started to approach the creek, the platoon started to see people running through the woods. The first report that we got was that there were three NVA running north through the woods, and they were loaded with RPGs was the way it came across the air. I reported it to the Squadron, and we were told to engage them. So we started to engage them with .50 caliber and the main gun of the tank with HE rounds because we were about 300 to 500 meters away from the wood line, which would make a good shot with HE rounds. Just about the time the exchange of fire began, an RPG or claymore exploded down by the bridge site killing two of my men that were down there securing the engineers and wounded two of the engineers. At the time of the contact, we pulled the third platoon on line facing west . There was a clearing across the creek. We were parallel to the creek and on the opposite side of it shooting across the clearing into the wood line, shooting at the NVA running north. We had the wounded and the two KIAs laying on the ground in front of the AVLB. We went up and tried to see whether we could still launch the AVLB across the site and determined that it was impossible, that the gap was too wide for the AVLB to span."

4. Question for D Company troopers: Do you recall anything about where you were, what you saw, heard, did during C Troop's contact?:

At 0732 Selsor has reported the engagement, and at 0736, hearing that he has casualties, I radio for dustoff for "3 personnel -- 2 Lima (litter), 1 Alpha (ambulatory) with shrapnel wounds." Five minutes later I get confirmation, "Dustoff 75, eta 10 (minutes). At 0745, not having direct contact with Brigade because I have only one frequency, I tell my TOC to forward the report, "Charlie Troop sighted approximately platoon size enemy force. Location X-Ray Tango 580533. Also active base camp for personnel in bunker complex."

Immediately after that, Selsor calls me to report one KIA.

[From my journal: "My mouth was dry and I felt sick to my stomach."]

I always took the loss of my men hard, never getting used to it.

Later he updates the casualties to 2 KIA

The artillery lifts long enough for me to bring in an air strike and then resumes once the aircraft clear the area. [Check this point. It's recorded in Spot Rep 3, 3d Brigade but not included in our logs or Div AAR. I don't recall we used air this early; however, 2 air strikes are unaccounted for in the after action report.]

Selsor is working fast. By 0745, just 13 minutes after his first contact and sustaining his casualties, he has already called me to tell me he cannot get the bridge launched and the enemy are fleeing north. I know we can probably get the bridge emplaced if we can use the dozer blade on the VTR to improve the site, but we have no time. [From my after-action interview:] "Since the report was that they were going north, I immediately discontinued putting the AVLB in and sent [Charlie] Troop to the north on the eastern side of [the] stream in an attempt to cut the fleeing NVA off."

Selsor's report says, "When we moved out from our AVLB site and were moving north paralleling the creek, the main unit or the lead unit, the 3rd platoon, spotted 3 NVA in a creek bed running and crouching in the creek bed, running north. We engaged them with a cannister round from the main gun killing two of them. The third one got away in the creek bed because we could not get down in there with one of our vehicles. We never did find him."

The Charlie troopers, now hastily sweeping the contact area, recover two AK47's and one Chicom machine gun. On the bodies are some documents which Selsor's translator, a Viet Cong defector, begins to read for intelligence value. In this case they yield little of immediate use.

As this contact is going on and the dustoff is coming in, my pilot is still skirting the gun-target line of the artillery. I have to pay full attention now to the movement of my ground units, Charlie Troop leading the rush north, so I tell my artilleryman to lift the fire going into the base camp. At 0758 he tells me, "End of mission, final rounds on the way, wait," and soon after the explosions the scouts are again at treetop level to give a damage assessment and see what else we have to do about that base camp. The scouts report seeing 4 bodies in the area that C Troop had under fire. During the 33 minutes of the barrage, 98 rounds of 105 mm and 21 rounds of 155 have been worked through the bunker area, almost four rounds per minute, some of it within 200 meters of Selsor's troops across the stream, providing them covering fire during their contact.

I instruct D Company to follow Charlie Troop north.

5. Question: The log contains no reports from D Company at this point. Any recollections?

At the same time I spur on Bravo Troop to their east, now moving north as fast as possible to a blocking position at the extreme northern tip of the plantation. By 0814 Captain Dennis tells me he is at Phase Line Jack, nearing his objective. From my position over Charlie Troop I cannot see Bravo's vehicles at the very edge of the rubber but am well pleased with his report of good progress.

At 0821 the sergeant at the dustoff site reports dustoff complete, headed for Dau Tieng.

[From Doc McGeady's journal:] "We went North now, the AVLB plan now scrapped. We crossed the stream and raced West in 2 column sweep, hoping to box in the NVA who were moving North on 3 sides & force them to fight."

At 0825, Sidewinder 35, the FAC, tells me he has an air strike on station when I need it. He says they can stay overhead for awhile. They do not have long to wait. Major Cummings calls to tell me his scouts have movement in the base camp, about nine hundred meters in from where we had attempted to launch the AVLB and suggests that as a target. His gun ships, reloaded and rearmed, have just reported they are off from Phu Loi, headed this way, but won't arrive for several minutes. I ask Sidewinder if he has my Charlie and Delta units in sight. He says affirmative, he has been watching them, that there should be no problem with a strike that far from them. He marks the target with a smoke rocket, says his fighter bombers have the target in sight, and he brings in the F100s. A few minutes later Sidewinder tells me they are going to make a firing pass for their third and final run, and in a couple of minutes they roll in, one behind the other. I do not get to watch their 20 mm cannon fire because Charlie Troop again is in contact. They have reached our usual ford site and turned west. At 0842 they report receiving fire from both north and south, XT 567555, approximately platoon size. I see and hear them below me, opening up.

Earlier, by racing north, then fording the stream, I had hoped my units could cut off the enemy. [From my report:] "In fact it turned out that they did just this. They hooked into them as [Charlie troop] made a western move and immediately came under fire and returned fire on both sides of the column to the north and to the south."

[From Selsor's report:] "[In our alternate plan] we would go further north and cross at our normal crossing, get on line, and sweep south. I'd be on the western flank, and the tank company would be on my left on the eastern flank sweeping south. This was basically the plan that we used. We moved up north, changed our formation into a double column formation for added security since we had already had a little bit of contact. We went up to our normal crossing site and started sweeping west. We swept straight west in a double column formation. As we got further west, we were about 300 meters beyond the stream where the grain of the rubber makes it impossible to keep a double column formation, before we got on line. As we were getting to the point where we were going to go on line and start sweeping south, I started receiving fire from both sides of the road or trail that we were on -- a trail that moves through the rubber. We engaged at that time, deploying into a herring-bone formation so we could bring fire to both sides of the road. A herring-bone formation is where the tracks just alternate the direction that they are facing. We [are] in column facing in one direction, and when we herring-bone, one track turns to the left and the other turns to the right. This way they can bring their .50 calibers, their 7.62 machine guns, and also main guns to fire in opposite directions. It gives you all around security. After the contact subsided, we couldn't actually see whether we had inflicted any casualties at all. We took no casualties. The forces we saw running through the rubber trees] before we had turned across the creek were about a platoon size. Finally we had seen almost twenty to thirty people running, heading north. When we turned west, I believe we actually cut them in half. That is why we received fire from both sides. I think we were engaged probably with no more than a squad, but we cut them in half, and that is why they had to fight, and they really did not want to engage us at that time."

6. Question: Do any D troopers recall the engagement of Charlie Troop ahead of you, and what you saw and did?

This news leads me to believe we have cut off most of the enemy although some have escaped north. Now I want to box him in and eliminate him.

At 0844 the air strike is high and dry and Selsor tells me the enemy has broken contact. I need to do something about those to the north of the column and figure that my ARPs should be able to handle them. Darkhorse 37, with two gun ships and two scouts, reports he is on station. This means they will be available to cover the ARPs insertion, and at 0849 I direct Cummings to have them airborne and insert them vicinity XT 570570 as a blocking force, a location 2,000 meters to the north of Charlie Troop. This will be a little dicey since Bravo Troop is now approaching this area, headed toward its blocking position only 1,000 meters north of that landing spot. I caution all commanders to make sure their elements know what is happening and that we closely communicate so we don't get one unit firing into another. The ARPs will be inserted only 1,000 yards north of Charlie Troop. If it happens that the ARPs alone can handle the enemy fleeing north, as I suspect, I have another role in mind for B Troop. For now the troop will continue to move toward its blocking position.

[From my report:] "My feeling was that the major portion of the enemy was still to the south of [Charlie Troop] after having outraced them to the north. Consequently I turned the troop to the south on line, brought my Delta Company of the 11th Cav in, and turned them on line. Thus with Charlie Troop of the 1-4 Cav and Delta Company of the 1-11 Cav on line, we began our sweep south."

While my units are positioning themselves, I want to take a closer look at that base camp south of them and the results of the air strike. My pilot plunges into the usual heart-stopping rapid descent maneuver and we level out just above the trees, leaving the armor column stretching to the right and left behind us. I lean out into the onrushing air, looking down and not seeing much until in a couple seconds we are in the still-smoking area. I can taste the cordite of the explosives as we fly through the smoke. I see that, unfortunately, the bombs have hit 20 meters north of some bunkers. It's hard to tell in just these few seconds whether they have done any substantial damage, and we make another pass, then pull back up to altitude. I actually see no enemy, so if they are present, they are keeping their heads down. At 0852 I report my bomb damage assessment to the TOC, "BDA of air strike negative."

I have been spurring my commanders on, telling them we must attack without delay into those enemy fleeing south. My two units below me soon report they are on line and have tied in their flanks with one another. Delta Company is on the east, facing south with its left flank on the stream we forded. Its ten tanks extend only about a hundred to a hundred fifty or so meters to the west. Charlie Troop's left flank is married up with Delta's right flank, and the Cav troop, with three times as many armored vehicles, extends another four hundred fifty or so meters farther west. Selsor has slightly echeloned his right flank to provide better protection during the advance. My headquarters ACAV section and VTR are just behind where the two units join. A few minutes after 0900 I get the report from the commanders they are ready. Up to this point the rubber trees have impeded their movement onto line, but now the trails and rows of trees leading south will actually help in the control of the units. Both units have put an armored vehicle in about every other lane or every third lane where they can cover one another. They will be automatically properly spaced as they proceed down the lanes, and the track commanders will be able to see well to their right and left in order to keep on line. Tank turrets will be able to traverse sufficiently to cover the entire area to their front. The track commanders are aware that sometimes during movement they may have to jockey through and across lanes to avoid the huge ant hills that here and there dot the plantation floor, or to go around messes of downed trees from 11th ACR's maneuvers and contacts of a week ago. There is no way in the rubber to conduct the kind of freewheeling, broad swooping movement of Rommel's and Montgomery's armor in the deserts of North Africa. The long-taught armor doctrine of Fort Knox -- Move, Shoot, and Communicate -- is applied somewhat differently in the rubber, but it still applies. We will advance as fast as possible, recon heavily by fire ahead of us with tank cannon and machine guns, and keep talking with one another to maintain control and exploit the situation.

At 0905 I tell the commanders to be sure to maintain a line abreast so that no one is hit by our own fire, and I order them to advance. It is three hours and twenty minutes after we left Doc, and an hour and forty minutes after our first contact. We have been running on adrenaline, and our jungle fatigues long since have been soaked with sweat. Every now and then I have had to remove my sunglasses and wipe them off where drops have splattered.

The line begins its move at the pace of a runner jogging, and the .50 calibers open up in short bursts, firing 50 meters and more ahead of them. Every few seconds this tank or that stops, quickly fires a canister round, and then moves on. Overhead I see and hear what is happening below me. The sound and fury of an armor unit in the advance in combat is impressive, even when it is only reconning by fire. Under me the line whipsaws a little here and there, but generally it progresses well, with vehicles abreast of one another. Somehow, probably because vehicles have to divert around an obstacle in the lane ahead, a small gap opens up between D Company's right flank and C Troop's left. When Captain Bill Newell, my Assistant S-3 in one of the headquarters section ACAVs, reports what is happening, I tell him to plug the gap. My headquarters command section platoon leader, acting quickly, leads a couple of his ACAVs into it. Suddenly, rocket propelled grenades are fired at them from their front. The RPGs miss the vehicles and explode loudly and almost harmlessly to their rear, and my headquarters ACAVs open up on the enemy. The time is 0910. First Lieutenant Walter Kurtz, the squadron commo officer, is aboard one of these tracks. He says, "When all hell broke loose the VTR even moved up on line. I have a vivid memory of it to my direct left with its .50 firing through the entire engagement. There was a Warrant Officer from Maintenance on the VTR."

A couple headquarters men have taken small fragments, none seriously. Several men leap off their tracks. All headquarters troopers, regardless of their jobs, are trained to act as riflemen when needed. They scramble to regain balance and then engage with their M16s. In a moment it is over. Five NVA are dead.

As this is happening at 0911, Selsor is reporting that his left flank only a few yards away from that same spot is engaging 2 NVA. They have eluded the headquarters ACAVs and managed to escape C Troop's fire as they run south. During the firing, at 0913 Darkhorse 6 reports that the ARPs are being inserted one ship at a time into the landing zone to the rear of the advancing line. I Roger that but have no time to monitor this action. At 0918, Selsor tells me his troops are still in contact and firing at 5 NVA running south. Overhead, I see and hear the battle picking up in intensity, and I urge on my commanders. With the enemy running there is only one thing to do, pursue. Quickly and relentlessly. I tell Selsor and Wyse to maintain their same pace forward. It is not a cavalry charge, impossible in these trees. But the enemy, lugging weapons, or even throwing them down and fleeing, will become soon exhausted and cannot outrace the armor

7. Question: Do any of you D Troopers recall hearing or observing this action to your right? If so, what did you do?

I want my B Troop now, but I cannot order it to move just yet while the ARPs are landing not more than a few hundred yards from them. I need the ARPs down and in place to block whatever enemy may still be fleeing north, and then I can order up my cav troop. I have in mind that I may want them to go across the rear of the southward moving line all the way past its right flank, and then hook south as quickly as possible down that flank into a blocking position where they can kill the enemy fleeing from D Company and Charlie Troop. A natural block will be provided by the stream on our left flank, with D Company moving always to keep its left-most tank on the stream bank. I radio a warning order to Captain Dennis, quickly outlining my plan and telling him to get ready to move. I get a calm "Wilco" from him. Dennis, a stoic, is not much one for getting into a flap no matter what the circumstances.

I'm over Charlie Troop when at 0921 I get a call from Darkhorse 6: "Baton [D/1-11 ACR] received one RPG. Has one vehicle knocked out."

From Selsor's report: "We got on line heading south, and the tank company . . behind us . . .got on line heading south so at this time they were on my left flank. . . .We had gone about 200 to 500 meters south when the left flank, the tank company, was engaged."

Actually, my headquarters command section had made the first contact and Selsor's own troop had participated, but as Selsor recounted the battle several days later, the tank engagement naturally was foremost in his mind.

He continues: "All I know of that contact is what I heard over the radio. I never actually saw the contact. From what I heard over the radio, the tank company on my left was starting to take heavy RPG rounds. And initially they had one killed and one tank knocked out, and they held in place. In fact I think they backed off a little bit after they got the wounded out. They backed up about 50 meters."

At 0927 we are requesting a dustoff, "XT 567546, 2 litters, 1 KIA." At 0932 we get confirmation, "Dustoff 75 ETA 10."

When I first hear the news I get that sick feeling again and want to puke. I am responsible for everyone under my command. Even though they are not on a 1-4 Cav roster, during a battle they are all my troopers. My first KIA, months earlier, had been not an assigned QuarterCav trooper but a platoon leader from a neighboring infantry battalion, a second lieutenant in Vietnam less than a week.

Later in the day I am to learn that the Delta Company KIA is SP4 Lyle Aston, 21 years old, married, father of a baby daughter.

8. Question: What did you see, do, hear during this action in which D Company took casualties? Describe as well as you can your own actions and those of your platoon and company for the next several hours.